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 ‘ Decisional ’ and  ‘ Operational ’ 
Negligence 
 Vincent  Ooi 
 A. Introduction 
 Traditionally, professional negligence has been thought of as a single area of law applicable 
to a wide range of situations, governed by a single test: the  Bolam 1 test. The advent of 
 Montgomery 2 provides an alternative test and raises questions as to when each test should 
apply. To answer this question, it may be helpful to attempt to draw a fi ner distinction 
between the various situations where professional negligence may arise. It is submitted 
that professional negligence cases can be further classifi ed into two categories:  ‘ decisional ’ 
negligence and  ‘ operational ’ negligence. 
 ‘ Decisional ’ negligence arises where a professional advising his client acts in a manner 
that no reasonably competent professional would have acted, thereby causing his client to 
proceed with a certain course of action that he would otherwise have not taken. In these 
cases, the client has a choice between at least two alternatives. To illustrate, as will be 
argued later, decisional negligence will be said to occur where a solicitor fails to warn his 
client that there is a risk that a contractual or statutory provision may be interpreted in a 
manner adverse to the client, 3 and the client relies upon this advice to pursue a course of 
action when he would otherwise have chosen an alternative course of action. 
 Conversely, cases of  ‘ operational ’ negligence concern the manner in which a 
professional acts upon his client ’ s instructions to pursue a course of action (the client having 
already decided on which course of action to take). The negligence here would consist in a 
solicitor conducting a course of action in a manner that no reasonably competent solicitor 
would have done. A classic case of  ‘ operational ’ negligence is that of botched litigation, 
where a solicitor negligently sits on a case until it becomes time-barred, 4 bungles the 
collection of evidence, 5 or fails to enter a defence, 6 such that his client suffers adverse 
consequences. 
 It appears that  Montgomery has thrown the distinction between these two forms of 
negligence into focus, due to its focus on  ‘ decisional ’ negligence in the medical context. 
With  Montgomery , the law of medical negligence has come to place considerable emphasis 
 1  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [ 1957 ]  1 WLR 582 . 
 2  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [ 2015 ]  UKSC 11 , [2015] 2 WLR 768. 
 3  CW Dixey  & Sons Ltd v Parsons [ 1964 ]  EGD 454 ;  Queen Elizabeth ’ s Grammar School Blackburn Ltd  & Anor v Banks 
Wilson (A Firm) [ 2001 ]  EWCA Civ 1360 ;  Levicom International Holdings BV v Linklaters [ 2010 ]  EWCA Civ 494 ; 
 Herrmann v Withers LLP [ 2012 ]  EWHC 1492 (Ch);  Balogun v Boyes Sutton and Perry [ 2017 ]  EWCA Civ 75 ; and 
 Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors (A Firm) [ 2017 ]  EWCA Civ 2056 . 
 4  Kitchen v Royal Air Forces Association [ 1958 ]  2 All ER 241 (CA);  Yardley v Coombes ( 1963 )  107 SJ 575 ; and  Phillips 
 & Co v Whatley [ 2008 ]  Lloyd ’ s Rep IR 111 , PC . 
 5  Feakins v Burstow [ 2006 ]  PNLR 6 , 94 . 
 6  Cook v Swinfen [ 1967 ]  1 WLR 457  CA . 
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 7  Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [ 1998 ]  AC 232 . 
on the notion of patient autonomy and the need to ensure that patients are in a position 
to make informed choices as to the medical treatment they receive. While the traditional 
 Bolam test continues to hold medical professionals to the standard of the reasonable 
professional (in cases of  ‘ operational negligence ’ ),  Montgomery excludes the application 
of the  Bolam test in cases concerning the patient ’ s right to be informed of the risks of 
various treatments before he gives his consent to said treatment (cases of  ‘ decisional ’ 
negligence). 
 The impact of  Montgomery has reached beyond the sphere of medical professional 
negligence, and debate has arisen regarding the applicability of a  Montgomery- type standard 
of care to solicitors and fi nancial advisers who advise their clients to pursue a given course 
of action. However, to date, the courts have applied tests that are not clear applications of 
the  Montgomery or the  Bolam tests. This lack of conceptual clarity is lamented, given that 
both tests are underpinned by distinct principles. Upholding conceptual clarity will also 
go towards establishing principled bases for the measure of damages that may be awarded 
in the various negligence cases. 
 It appears that the Bolam test continues to reign supreme in cases of  ‘ operational ’ 
negligence. However, in  ‘ decisional ’ negligence cases, there is some uncertainty as to which 
test to apply in the non-medical professional negligence context. It is argued that the 
tests applied in  ‘ decisional ’ negligence cases must depend on the context of each case. 
The  Montgomery standard of care should apply limitedly to medical cases. In non-medical 
 ‘ decisional ’ negligence cases, where the policy justifi cations articulated in  Montgomery are 
less salient, the  Bolam test should continue to apply. In cases where courts doubt the 
rightness of the  Bolam test because of dubious evidence given by members of the relevant 
profession, the continued application of the  Bolitho 7 principle is preferable to resorting 
to the  Montgomery standard of care, which would otherwise encourage confusion. 
 B. Medical Negligence: The  Bolam and  Montgomery Tests 
 In the fi eld of medical negligence, the existing jurisprudence has long accepted that 
there might be a fundamental distinction between the type of negligence where a 
doctor acts negligently during a surgery (i.e.  ‘ operational ’ negligence) and where he fails 
adequately to inform the patient of the risks of a certain treatment or the alternatives 
(i.e.  ‘ decisional ’ negligence). The latter kind of case has recently come once again to the 
forefront in the form of the leading case of  Montgomery . 
 The  Bolam Test 
 The starting point for medical negligence is the  Bolam test that has since been extended 
to non-medical professional negligence cases as well. As laid out by McNair J in  Bolam 
v Friern Hospital Management Committee ,  ‘ [t]he test is the standard of the ordinary skilled 
man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest 
expert skill; it is well established law that it is suffi cient if he exercises the ordinary skill 
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 8  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [ 1957 ]  1 WLR 582 , 586 . 
 9  Ibid at 582, 587. 
 10  JM  Laing ,  ‘ Delivering Informed Consent post-Montgomery :  Implications for Medical Practice and 
Professionalism ’ ( 2017 )  2  PN  128 – 152, 132 . 
 11  Supra n 8 at 232, 241. 
 12  Ibid at 232, 241 – 242. 
 13  Ibid at 232, 243. I am grateful to Benjamin Foo, Esther Wong and the anonymous referee for their insightful 
comments. 
 14  Ibid . 
 15  Supra n 10 at 128 – 152, 130. 
 16  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital [ 1985 ]  AC 871 , 895, 900 . 
 17  Ibid at 871, 885 – 886, 889 – 890. 
of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art ’ . 8 Further, a doctor is  ‘ not 
guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art ’ . 9 
 Regaining Control over the  Bolam Test 
 Despite the general acceptance of the  Bolam test, courts grew concerned about ceding 
control over the ability to set the standard of care in negligence to the medical profession. 10 
Accordingly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in  Bolitho raised the spectre that the  Bolam test 
might allow a  ‘ doctor [to escape] liability for negligent treatment or diagnosis just 
because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of the 
opinion that the defendant ’ s treatment accorded with sound medical practice. ’ 11 
 Bolitho therefore introduced two qualifi cations to the  Bolam test. First, the  ‘ court has 
to be satisfi ed that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate 
that such opinion has a logical basis ’ . Second, a court must be satisfi ed that  ‘ in forming 
their views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and 
benefi ts and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter ’ . 12 
 The application of the new  Bolitho test would result in  ‘ cases where, despite a body 
of professional opinion sanctioning the defendant ’ s conduct, the defendant can properly 
be held liable for negligence ’ . In these  ‘ rare ’ cases,  ‘ [if] it can be demonstrated that the 
professional opinion is not capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled 
to hold that the body of opinion is not reasonable or responsible ’ . 13 That being the case, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson added that  ‘ it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the 
conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable. 
The assessment of medical risks and benefi ts is a matter of clinical judgment which 
a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence ’ . 14 
 Development of the Patient Autonomy Approach 
 The  Bolam test has been applied beyond clinical diagnosis and treatment to cover the 
situation where doctors disclose the risks of proposed treatments to their patients. 15 In 
 Sidaway , the majority of their Lordships were in favour of applying the  Bolam test in 
such contexts. 16 Lord Scarman alone dissented and argued for the imposition of a new 
duty in these contexts, proposing the foundations of what would eventually become the 
 Montgomery principle. 17 His Lordship stated that  ‘ English law must recognise a duty of the 
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 18  Ibid . 
 19  Ibid at 871, 900. 
 20  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [ 2015 ]  UKSC 11 , [2015] 2 WLR 768, [81]. 
 21  Ibid at [75]. 
 22  Ibid at [86]. 
 23  Ibid at [87]. 
doctor to warn his patient of risk inherent in the treatment which he is proposing: and 
especially so, if the treatment be surgery. Critically, this duty is confi ned to material risk. 
The test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court 
is satisfi ed that a reasonable person in the patient ’ s position would be likely to attach 
signifi cance to the risk. Even if the risk is material, the doctor will not be liable if upon a 
reasonable assessment of his patient ’ s condition he takes the view that a warning would be 
detrimental to his patient ’ s health. ’ 18 
 But even as Lord Bridge advocated the application of the  Bolam test in the context 
of the duty of disclosure, he seemed to accept that this particular area might raise special 
concerns. In  Sidaway , his Lordship stated that he did not think that the  Bolam test required 
the Courts  ‘ to hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the scope of 
the duty of disclosure, including the question whether there has been a breach of that 
duty ’ . He further stated that even where no expert witness testifi es that accepted and 
responsible medical practice requires disclosure,  ‘ the judge might in certain circumstances 
come to the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to 
an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man 
would fail to make it ’ . 19 
 Montgomery 
 By the time  Montgomery was decided, their Lordships had acknowledged that there 
had been a major paradigm shift in the doctor – patient relationship away from medical 
paternalism. 20 Patients were to be  ‘ regarded as persons holding rights rather than as the 
passive recipients of the care of the medical profession ’ . 21 
 Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the  Bolam test in 
situations of risk disclosure and laid out a new approach, 22 under which a doctor is: 
 ‘ under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of 
any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any 
reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, 
in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient ’ s 
position would be likely to attach signifi cance to the risk, or the doctor is or 
should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
signifi cance to it. ’ 23 
 At the heart of the decision to reject the  Bolam test in cases of risk disclosure lay a 
fundamental distinction, as their Lordships saw it, between  ‘ the doctor ’ s role when 
considering possible investigatory or treatment options ’ , which involved  ‘ an exercise of 
professional skill and judgment  … falling within the expertise of members of the medical 
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 24  Ibid at [83]. 
 25  Ibid at [82]. 
 26  Ibid at [85]. 
 27  Ibid at [85]. 
 28  R  Heywood and  J  Miola ,  ‘ The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure :  Placing the Patient at the 
Heart of the Matter ’ ( 2017 )  133 ( Apr )  LQR ,  296 – 321, 319 – 320 . 
 29  Ibid at 296 – 321, 311. 
 30  Supra n 16 at 871, 900. 
profession ’ 24 to which the  Bolam test could be validly applied, and her role in discussing 
with the patient any recommended treatment and possible alternatives, and the risks 
of injury which may be involved, ’ 25 which was not a judgment  ‘ dependent on medical 
expertise ’ . 26 In the latter case: 
 ‘ the skill and judgment required are not of the kind with which the  Bolam test 
is concerned; and the need for that kind of skill and judgment does not entail 
that the question whether to explain the risks at all is normally a matter for the 
judgment of the doctor ’ . 27 
 The  ‘ Decisional ’ and  ‘ Operational ’ Negligence Distinction 
in  Montgomery 
 The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in  Montgomery between risk disclosure 
and treatment maps neatly onto the distinction between  ‘ decisional ’ and  ‘ operational ’ 
negligence proposed in this article. While  ‘ operational ’ negligence relates to the actual 
skills and expertise of the medical profession,  ‘ decisional ’ negligence engages matters 
of professional ethics. The Supreme Court effectively decided in  Montgomery that the 
judiciary shall be the adjudicator when it comes to matters of medical ethics. 28 
 While a doctor acting within ethical guidelines could previously be secure in the 
knowledge that he would not be found to be negligent, post- Montgomery , the courts only 
need to consider existing guidelines and are not bound by them. A doctor complying 
with ethical guidelines may therefore be found to be negligent, but a doctor who has 
breached ethical guidelines may not be found to be negligent. That being said, it does not 
appear that the courts are ready to disregard established ethical guidelines wholesale. 29 
Rather, as seen from Lord Bridge ’ s approach in  Sidaway , 30 the  Montgomery approach may 
simply be a means for the courts to preserve the ability to depart from the standard 
of the reasonable professional where they feel that the profession does not accord their 
patients with the rights which they feel patients should have. 
 C.  ‘ Operational ’ Negligence: A Duty to Warn 
 The Existence of a  ‘ Duty to Warn ’ 
 It is uncontroversial that a professional adviser who renders factually incorrect advice to 
his client without reasonable excuse will be held to be negligent. What is perhaps more 
uncertain is whether professional advisers have a duty to warn their clients of potential 
risks. An examination of the jurisprudence over time shows that this duty has long been 
recognised by the courts. 
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 31  Supra n 3,  CW Dixey . 
 32  Ibid . 
 33  Supra n 3,  Queen Elizabeth ’ s Grammar School at [47]. 
 34  Supra n 3,  Balogun at [38]. 
 35  Supra n 3,  Levicom at [249]. 
 36  Ibid . 
 37  Supra n 3,  Herrmann at [73] – [74]. 
 The duty to warn was recognised by the courts as early as 1964. In  Dixey v Parsons , 
a solicitor was held to be negligent for failing to protect his client  ‘ against a risk of being 
involved in litigation ’ , 31 given the  ‘ obvious danger that a different view might be taken ’ to 
his client ’ s detriment, with respect to the interpretation of a contract. Salmon J held that 
under those circumstances even if the solicitor was right as a matter of law,  ‘ the ordinary 
careful solicitor in his normal state would have gone to see his clients and advised them 
not to sign ’ . 32 
 There are three main points about this case that may be signifi cant: 1) the solicitor 
was under a duty to consider the risk of being involved in litigation; 2) there was an 
obvious danger that his client would suffer detriment; and 3) the duty applied even if the 
solicitor was right as a matter of law. 
 The Common Points 
 The fi rst two points are common to the cases following from  Dixey v Parsons . In  Queen 
Elizabeth ’ s Grammar School Blackburn v Banks Wilson , the Court of Appeal found that a 
conveyancer had a duty to warn about the risk of a contrary construction of a clause in 
a restrictive covenant. 33 Similarly, in  Balogun v Boyes Sutton and Perry , a solicitor was held 
by the Court of Appeal to be negligent because he failed to remove a risk to his client by 
amending a lease contract, where  ‘ the risk of a court coming to a different conclusion was 
suffi ciently great ’ . 34 
 Excessively Optimistic Advice 
 While the three cases noted above involved professionals who had breached their duties 
through omission (remaining silent when they should have given a warning), the next 
two cases demonstrate that a professional may also be negligent if he is excessively 
optimistic. In  Levicom v Linklaters , solicitors were found to be negligent in advising their 
client that it was  ‘ clear ’ that the defendant had breached a crucial clause in a contract. 35 
The Court of Appeal highlighted that  ‘ [i]t was particularly relevant to give a balanced view 
in the context of potential arbitration proceedings, since if the arbitration tribunal were 
to arrive at a different interpretation, it could not (save in rare circumstances) be the 
subject of appeal, even if objectively that interpretation might be incorrect ’ . 36 
 A similar situation arose in  Herrmann v Withers , where solicitors advised their clients 
in unequivocal terms that they would have  ‘ the right to enter into and use the garden ’ in 
question. Newey J held that the solicitors  ‘ were not entitled to be so confi dent of their 
interpretation of the 1851 Act as to relieve them of the need to enter the caveat that a 
court could take a different view ’ . 37 
 ‘ Correct ’ Advice: Does it Make a Difference ? 
 The last point raised in  Dixey v Parsons  – that is, whether it matters that a solicitor was 
right as a matter of law  – has been a matter of some dispute in a few (relatively) recent 
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 38  Supra n 3,  Barker at [72]. 
 39  Halsall v Champion Consulting [ 2017 ]  STC 1958 (QB), 1989 – 1990. 
 40  Moy v Pettman Smith [ 2005 ]  1 WLR 581 , 587 . 
 41  Ibid . 
cases. In  Barker v Baxendale Walker , there was a clear difference of opinion between the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal, with the latter overruling the former and stating 
unequivocally that: 
 ‘ Roth J was wrong to conclude that where the solicitor ’ s interpretation of 
the particular provision is likely to be correct it is diffi cult to see that they 
would also be in breach of a duty to warn unless the arguments were fi nely 
balanced. Although the question of whether there is real scope for dispute or a 
signifi cant risk turns in substantial part upon the strength of the arguments for 
and against the particular construction, it also depends upon all of the relevant 
circumstances. ’ 38 
 The approach of the Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker is perhaps best supported 
by the judgment of Moulder J in  Halsall v Champion Consulting , who made it clear that 
 ‘ [t]he fact that some of the companies succeeded and that some of the schemes went 
unchallenged by the Revenue [was in his] view irrelevant to the question of whether the 
reasonably competent tax adviser would have given an unconditional assurance that the 
[scheme] would work effectively ’ . 39 As it happens, the tax advisers in  Halsall v Champion 
Consulting did manage to escape liability because the claims were time-barred. 
 Thus, it would appear that there is support for the position of the Court of Appeal 
in  Barker v Baxendale Walker that a solicitor might nevertheless have a duty to warn his 
client as to the risks of taking a certain course of action, even if his interpretation turns out 
to be right. The position is somewhat complicated by the existence of a House of Lords 
judgment decided a decade earlier that was not considered in  Barker v Baxendale Walker . 
 In  Moy v Pettman Smith , the claimant received negligent surgical treatment after 
injuring his leg playing football. The success of the case hinged on the court ’ s decision 
on whether to accept adduction of the evidence of a surgeon. The claimant ’ s solicitor 
considered that there was a 50:50 chance of success that the evidence would be adduced 
and accordingly advised the claimant to proceed with the action, but did not explain 
her basis for the advice. Eventually, it became clear that the court would not accept 
the adduction of the evidence and the claimant had to settle for a lower fi gure than 
previously offered by the hospital. The claimant sued his solicitor on the basis that she had 
failed to give him proper advice on his prospects of beating the initial offer made to him. 
 Their Lordships found for the solicitor, crucially holding that since her advice 
was not negligent, she could not have been negligent merely because she had failed to 
explain the basis of her assessment. Lord Hope stated that  ‘ [i]t is diffi cult to see why the 
advice can be said to have been negligently wrong if the assessment on which it was 
based was not negligent ’ . 40 Lord Carswell similarly stated that he had  ‘ great diffi culty 
in accepting that if [the solicitor] was not at fault in deciding to advise the claimant to 
proceed with the action, she was negligent in failing to spell out the considerations which 
led her to give that advice ’ . 41 
Professional Negligence, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2018
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 42  Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors (a fi rm) [ 2016 ]  EWHC 664 (Ch), [136]. 
 43  Ibid at [147]. 
 44  Ibid . 
 The existence of this case renders the legal position rather uncertain. For 
one,  Moy v Pettman Smith is a decision of the House of Lords, but was not even cited in 
 Barker v Baxendale Walker , let alone applied. Of course, having been decided a decade earlier, 
their Lordships in  Moy v Pettman Smith would not have had the benefi t of considering 
the cases which subsequently followed. It remains for a future Supreme Court decision 
to fi x defi nitively the legal position. 
 Nature of the Duty to Warn 
 A close reading of the  Barker v Baxendale Walker line of cases suggests that the issue may 
not be as simple as saying that a professional may or may not be negligent based on the 
 ‘ correctness ’ of his advice. Indeed, the  ‘ correctness ’ of advice is likely to be only one of the 
factors relevant to determining whether the duty to warn has been breached. 
 Barker v Baxendale Walker 
 In this case, a shareholder engaged solicitors to design a tax avoidance scheme intended 
to avoid capital gains tax and inheritance tax. The scheme hinged on the construction of 
section 28(4) Inheritance Tax Act 1984. On the solicitor ’ s interpretation, the term  ‘ is ’ in 
that section referred to the date on which assets in a trust are applied for the benefi t of 
the benefi ciaries, whereas Her Majesty ’ s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was of the view 
that it referred to the date at which assets were transferred to the trust. HMRC ’ s 
construction would mean that the scheme would fail. Eventually, the shareholder was 
advised that HMRC ’ s construction was likely to prevail and entered into a settlement 
with HMRC, before suing their solicitor for negligent tax advice. 
 Noticeably, the High Court and Court of Appeal differed on the level of risk that 
triggered a solicitor ’ s duty to warn his client of the risk of litigation arising from an 
incorrect interpretation of the law. 
 At the High Court, Roth J found for the solicitor, holding that  ‘ [w]hether a 
warning of an alternative interpretation is required depends  entirely on the circumstances 
(emphasis added) ’ . Further,  ‘ of particular signifi cance in that regard is whether the 
solicitor can reasonably be confi dent that his interpretation is correct or, put another way, 
whether the risk of an alternative interpretation is clear ’ . 42 Roth J reviewed the existing 
jurisprudence and concluded that  ‘ in all these decisions concerning a warning, the court 
found that the view of construction taken by the lawyer was either wrong (albeit not 
negligent) or that at the very least there were such strong factors favouring an alternative 
construction that this should have been pointed out by a lawyer presenting a balanced 
view to their client ’ . 43 Roth J further noted that it appeared that this was the basis of 
the previous courts  ‘ on which they hold that any lawyer exercising appropriate skill 
and care would have given a warning that there was a serious risk that his preferred 
interpretation might well be wrong ’ and that  ‘ it is also of relevance if the lawyer is on actual 
notice of the potential challenge to his construction at the time he gave advice ’ . 44 
 The Court of Appeal took a different position, holding that while the solicitor was 
not negligent in his construction of section 28(4), the question was  ‘ whether in the light 
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 45  Supra n 3,  Barker at [59]. 
 46  Ibid at [71]. 
 47  Ibid at [61]. 
 48  Supra n 3,  CW Dixey ;  Queen Elizabeth ’ s Grammar at [47];  Balogun at [38];  Barker at [71]. 
 49  Supra n 3,  Levicom at [249]. 
 50  Supra n 3,  Barker at [67]. 
 51  Supra n 3,  CW Dixey . 
 52  Supra n 3,  Barker at [61]. 
 53  Supra n 3,  Levicom at [249];  Herrmann at [73] – [74]; and supra n 39,  Halsall . 
of all the circumstances no reasonably competent solicitor in the position of the [solicitor] 
would have failed to give the specifi c warning that there was a signifi cant risk that the 
[tax avoidance] arrangement would fail to be tax effective ’ . 45 On the facts, the Court of 
Appeal held that  ‘ [t]here was a signifi cant risk that their advice was wrong and in all the 
circumstances, a reasonably competent solicitor would have gone beyond his own view 
and set out the risks ’ . 46 
 In considering the issue, the Court of Appeal laid out a framework for the 
assessment of whether a solicitor has a duty to warn his client. First,  ‘ [t]he question of 
whether a solicitor is in breach of a duty to explain the risk that a court may come to 
a different interpretation from that which he advises is correct is highly fact sensitive ’ . 
Secondly,  ‘ [i]f the construction of the provision is clear, it is very likely that whatever the 
circumstances, the threshold of  “ signifi cant risk ” will not be met and it will not be necessary 
to caveat the advice given and explain the risks involved ’ . Thirdly,  ‘ [h]owever depending 
on the circumstances, it is perfectly possible to be correct about the construction of a 
provision or, at least, not negligent in that regard, but nevertheless to be under a duty to 
point out the risks involved and to have been negligent in not having done so ’ . Fourthly, 
 ‘ [i]t is more likely that there will be a duty to point out the risks, or to put the matter 
another way, that a reasonably competent solicitor would not fail to point them out 
when advising, if litigation is already on foot or the point has already been taken, although 
this need not necessarily be the case ’ . Finally,  ‘ [t]he issue is not one of percentages or 
whether opposing possible constructions are  “ fi nely balanced ” but is more nuanced ’ . 47 
 The Relevant Considerations 
 Regarding whether a solicitor has a duty to warn his client of a risk of litigation on the 
facts, a court is likely to fi nd that such a solicitor has a duty to warn his client where there 
is a high risk that a solicitor might be wrong. 48 A duty to warn may also arise where 
the consequences of the solicitor ’ s interpretation being wrong are severe. For example, 
in  Levicom v Linklaters , the court held it to be relevant that  ‘ in the context of potential 
arbitration proceedings, since if the arbitration tribunal were to arrive at a different 
interpretation, it could not (save in rare circumstances) be the subject of appeal, even if 
objectively that interpretation might be incorrect ’ . 49 In  Barker v Baxendale Walker Lady 
Justice Asplin held that it was relevant that the tax avoidance scheme was aggressive and 
that there was a considerable amount at stake. 50 
 Where such a duty has been held to exist, a solicitor must warn his client about 
risks of being involved in litigation, 51 especially where  ‘ litigation is already on foot or 
the point has already been taken ’ . 52 Failure to do this will result in a breach of the duty. 
A solicitor is also more likely to be found to have breached his duty where he has assured 
his client in unequivocal terms about prospects of success of the course of action. 53 
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 55  Supra n 3,  Barker at [60]. 
 56  Supra n 40. 
 57  Saif Ali v Mitchell  & Co [ 1980 ]  AC 198, 220 – 221 and 231 ;  Matrix Securities Ltd v Theodore Goddard [ 1998 ] 
 PNLR 290 , 321 ;  Green v Collyer Bristow [ 1999 ]  Lloyds Rep PN 798 , 809 ;  Arthur JS Hall  & Co v Simons [ 2002 ] 
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Civ 369 , [97] and [103];  McFaddens (a fi rm) v Platford [ 2009 ]  EWHC 126 (TCC), [49] and [50]; and  supra n 42, 
 Barker at [126]. 
 It emerges that the existence of a duty and its breach turns on a fact-sensitive 
analysis. The Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker thus appears correct in saying 
that  ‘ [t]he issue is not one of percentages or whether opposing possible constructions 
are  “ fi nely balanced ” but is more nuanced ’ . 54 Rather,  ‘ the advice which a reasonably 
competent solicitor would give in the circumstances turns substantially upon the view 
that he could take of the provision on which it turns. It is also dependent upon whether 
contrary arguments as to construction are of suffi cient signifi cance to require specifi c 
mention when taken with the degree of risk inherent in the circumstances and the 
importance in those circumstances of a balanced view of the provision. ’ 55 
 Reconciling  Moy v Pettman Smith 
 Returning to  Moy v Pettman Smith , it is submitted that the decision of their Lordships 
is reconcilable with the principles set out above. In the fi rst place, no duty existed on 
the solicitor ’ s part. The risk that the solicitor might be wrong was not particularly high 
(50 per cent) and the consequences of her being wrong were not particularly severe. 
In any case, she never advised her client in unequivocal terms about the prospect of 
success of the litigation. It was obvious to the client that the matter was already the 
subject of litigation. It is thus unsurprising that their Lordships held that given that the 
solicitor was not negligent in advising her client to proceed with the litigation, she could 
not be negligent in failing to detail her basis for such advice. 56 Indeed, Lord Hope and 
Lord Carswell stated that they had  ‘ diffi culty ’ in accepting that the solicitor could be 
negligent in failing to warn her client even though she was not negligent in her advice. 
 As noted above, the House of Lords in  Moy v Pettman Smith did not have the benefi t 
of considering the long string of cases on this point which subsequently followed. It is 
submitted that perhaps their Lordships would have found it  ‘ less diffi cult ’ to accept that 
conclusion had the solicitor in  Moy v Pettman Smith acted in a manner more similar to 
those of her unlucky contemporaries in the abovementioned cases. 
 D. Applying  Montgomery to Non-Medical Professional 
Negligence Cases 
 The Orthodox Approach: The  Bolam Test 
 The  Bolam test has been consistently applied in non-medical professional negligence cases 
in substance for decades, 57 even if the  Bolam test has not expressly been referred to by 
name. Signifi cantly, in  McFaddens v Platford , Toulmin J stated that the: 
 ‘ standard to be applied is that the barrister must conduct himself in his 
professional work with the competence (care and skill) of a barrister of ordinary 
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skill who is competent to handle that type of and weight of work and a breach 
of that duty occurs when the error is one which no reasonably competent 
member of the profession possessing those skills should have made, ’ 58 
 and that this test  ‘ is consistent with the line of cases involving medical practitioners 
starting with the classic test of McNair J in  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee ’ . 59 This reading has been affi rmed by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of 
 Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors , which referred to and applied the  Bolam test in a case 
dealing with an allegedly negligent legal professional. 60 
 A New Standard:  Montgomery 
 The scope of application of  Montgomery outside non-medical professional negligence 
cases is far from clear. That said, since  Montgomery , the courts have had ample opportunity 
to consider whether the test should apply in non-medical professional negligence cases. 
 In determining the applicability of  Montgomery , on an expansive reading of the 
judgment,  Montgomery appears to reject the application of the  Bolam test in all cases of 
 ‘ decisional ’ negligence. However, it is submitted that  Montgomery was heavily motivated 
by the concerns specifi c to patient autonomy and thus, should rightly be confi ned to 
cases of medical negligence. The  Baker line of cases invoking a solicitor ’ s  ‘ duty to 
warn ’ applied within the  Bolam and  Bolitho frameworks suffi ce to address the broader 
concerns regarding informed consent in the non-medical context, and should not be 
overturned. 
 Baird v Hastings 
 In this case before the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, a solicitor was sued for 
alleged negligent conduct in conveyancing transactions. The claimant alleged that 
her solicitor failed to point to the risks of contracting and completing the purchase of 
one property before any contract was concluded on the second property. The Court of 
Appeal considered the applicability of the  Montgomery principle, holding that the: 
 ‘ doctor/patient relationship is not a full or true analogue of a solicitor/
client relationship since the therapeutic duties owed by a doctor to a patient 
raises different questions from those arising between a solicitor and client. 
However, a solicitor is bound to take reasonable care to ensure that the client 
understands the material legal risks that arise in any transaction which the 
client has asked the solicitor to handle on his behalf. As in the doctor/patient 
relationship the test of materiality is whether a reasonable client would be 
likely to attach signifi cance to the risks arising which should be reasonably 
foreseeable to the competent solicitor. As in the medical context, the advisory 
role of the solicitor must involve proper communication and dialogue with 
the client ’ . 61 
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 Thus, it would appear that the Court of Appeal felt that there was some scope of application 
for the  Montgomery principle in the context of alleged solicitor negligence. There was no 
mention of the  Bolam test in this case. 
 O ’ Hare v Coutts 
 Baird v Hastings was subsequently considered in  O ’ Hare v Coutts , which involved a fi nancial 
adviser sued for alleged negligence in recommending high-risk products. In fi nding for 
the fi nancial adviser, Kerr J at the High Court expressly rejected the  Bolam test. 62 Kerr J 
stated that the  ‘ reasoning in  Montgomery is not, in my judgment, irrelevant outside the 
medical context ’ 63 and that: 
 ‘ the differences between the medical and fi nancial contexts  … are not such as 
to lead to the conclusion that how much to say to a client is a question to be 
decided according to whether the adviser acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of persons skilled in the giving of 
fi nancial advice. ’ 64 
 Kerr J went on to state that the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS) accepted by 
the profession contained a  ‘ duty to explain in terms not dissimilar to the  Montgomery 
formulation ’ . 65 However, he further added that on the facts of the case, the COBS rules 
 ‘ add nothing to the obligations implied into the [claimants ’ ] contract and imposed by 
the common law of negligence, to ascertain the clients ’ requirements and objectives and 
to advise on, and explain and inform them, about investments that are suitable ’ . 66 
 Davies has argued that  ‘ [a]t its simplest, the decision in  O ’ Hare v Coutts represents 
a rejection of the  Bolam test in favour of the approach in  Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board ’ . 67 It is respectfully submitted that this may not necessarily be the case. 
While it is true that in  O ’ Hare v Coutts Kerr J did expressly reject the  Bolam test, the test 
he eventually did apply was not the  Montgomery test. Kerr J appears to have applied the 
COBS rules instead, which, although they make reference to certain duties to inform 
the client, crucially do not include a test of materiality. In a sense, while the COBS rules 
and the  Montgomery principle are based on the common aim of informing the client/ 
patient, the COBS rules are not to be confl ated with the  Montgomery principle. 
 There is a further complication in that Kerr J stated that on the facts of the case, the 
COBS rules did not add anything to the duties already owed by the fi nancial adviser to 
his clients arising from contract and the common law of negligence. 68 The question then 
arises as to exactly what was the nature of the test applied by Kerr J. It is submitted that in 
most cases, one would expect the reasonable professional to exercise a standard precisely 
in line with the ethical rules of the profession. In other words, applying the COBS rules 
and the  Bolam test should give the same result. It is submitted that this is precisely the 
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reason why the Supreme Court had to create the  Montgomery principle: because the 
ethical rules of the medical profession did not provide patients with the level of rights 
which the Courts deemed necessary. 
 In applying the COBS rules rather than looking for  ‘ a responsible body of 
professionals ’ , it does not seem that Kerr J has applied the  Montgomery principle. Rather, 
this would appear to be more of a  ‘ Bolitho -type ’ case, where, even though the court attempts 
to apply the  Bolam test, it is unable to fi nd a body of professional opinion that is reasonable 
or responsible. 69 The next best alternative, is thus to look to the established guidelines of 
the profession. It is respectfully submitted that in spite of Kerr J ’ s express rejection of the 
 Bolam test and acceptance of the  Montgomery principle, he seems to have applied a test that 
is much closer to the  Bolam test and most certainly not the  Montgomery principle. 
 Barker v Baxendale Walker 
 The Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker was presented with  O ’ Hare v Coutts , but 
declined to comment. 70 However, it did clearly reject the application of the  Montgomery 
principle to that case, stating that: 
 ‘ [t]he question with which the Supreme Court [in  Montgomery ] had to grapple 
was whether there was a separate duty to inform or warn. It is not surprising 
therefore, that a different test, one of materiality, was applied and that the 
question of whether a warning/information should have been given to the 
patient was not considered to be a matter of medical learning and accordingly, 
was not governed by the approach in the  Bolam case. ’ 71 
 It went on to explain that in the case before the Court: 
 ‘ legal advice was the very service which was being provided and which was 
being relied upon. There can be no separation between the advice and any 
appropriate caveats as to risk. They are one and the same. The lawyer as part of 
the legal advice he is providing, must evaluate the legal position and determine 
whether in all of the circumstances, he should advise his client that there is 
a signifi cant risk that the view he has taken about the substantive matter in 
question may be wrong. ’ 
 Importantly,  ‘ that is a question of law and legal expertise and not a policy question ’ . 72 
Thus, it seems clear that the Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker saw the duty 
to warn a client as one within the expertise of the legal profession and not an ethical one 
to be determined by the Courts. It follows that on that approach, the  Bolam test should 
continue to be applied in determining whether a solicitor has a duty to warn a client. 
 The issue is once again somewhat complicated when we examine what the 
Court of Appeal did in  Barker v Baxendale Walker as opposed to what they said. Despite 
purporting to apply the  Bolam test, the Court of Appeal rejected the evidence of the 
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experts before the Court, saying that they  ‘ were at best, an unrepresentative group ’ 
and that  ‘ [e]ven if it had been relevant to consider the standards applied by a body of 
expert professional opinion, they were not such a body ’ . 73 It is important to bear in 
mind that just because the  Bolam test is not applied in a textbook manner, it does not 
immediately follow that what is being applied is the  Montgomery principle. Instead, what 
appears to have happened here is once again a  ‘ Bolitho -type ’ situation, where even though 
the court attempts to apply the  Bolam test, it is unable to fi nd a body of professional 
opinion that is reasonable or responsible. 74 However, unlike in  O ’ Hare v Coutts , the Court 
of Appeal did not seem to have had the benefi t of consulting any professional guidelines 
in this case. Instead, it appears to have determined the issue by itself, by concluding 
that a reasonable solicitor would have warned the client and thus, in failing to do so, the 
solicitor in  Barker v Baxendale Walker had been negligent. 
 In cases of negligence of legal professionals, it may seem that a court is better 
placed to apply the  Bolam test even without expert evidence. However, it is noted that 
precisely this issue has been considered by the House of Lords before in  Moy v Pettman , 
where Baroness Hale cautioned that in such cases there is  ‘ an obvious risk that a judge 
will ask himself what he would have done in the particular circumstances of the case. 
But that is not the test ’ . 75 Lord Hope added that: 
 ‘ judges need to be careful lest the decision in the case depends on the standard 
they would set for themselves. If this were to happen, it would vary from judge 
to judge and become arbitrary. Considerable weight should therefore be given 
to the decision of the judge at fi rst instance who heard all the evidence. ’ 76 
 That being said, if the Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker did, as in  Bolitho , 
decide that it was unable to fi nd a body of professional opinion that is reasonable or 
responsible, 77 in the absence of any other credible evidence, one can hardly blame it for 
attempting to work out what a reasonable solicitor would have done in that situation. 
 Can  Montgomery Be Applied to Non-Medical Professional 
Negligence Cases ? 
 While there is no denying the infl uence that  Montgomery appears to have had outside 
the sphere of medical negligence, there is currently very little support in the case law 
for such an extension. As respectfully submitted above,  O ’ Hare v Coutts does not seem 
to be a case where the  Montgomery principle was applied. Further, in the leading case 
of  Barker v Baxendale Walker , the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the application of the 
 Montgomery principle in such cases. In light of this,  Baird v Hastings appears to be a bit of 
a (non-binding) anomaly. 
 If we consider that much of the reasoning in  Montgomery focused on concerns very 
specifi c to the medical profession and was heavily motivated by the desire to protect 
patient autonomy, there is questionable basis for extending the reasoning in  Montgomery 
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outside the context of medical negligence. At the very least, the  Montgomery principle 
should not be applied wholesale to non-medical professional negligence cases. As the 
Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker stated, it does not make sense to consider 
the issue of materiality in cases of legal negligence, for  ‘ legal advice was the very 
service which was being provided and which was being relied upon. There can be no 
separation between the advice and any appropriate caveats as to risk. They are one and 
the same. ’ 78 
 It is understandable that there may be occasional diffi culties in the application 
of the  Bolam test. However, if such diffi culties stem from the inability of the Court to 
fi nd a body of professional opinion that is reasonable or responsible, 79 the solution is 
not to apply the  Montgomery principle but to follow the reasoning in  Bolitho and let 
the Court determine what a reasonable professional in that situation would do. In light 
of the analysis above, it appears that the test for  ‘ decisional ’ negligence in non-medical 
professional negligence cases is not the  Montgomery principle, but the  Bolam test, applied 
within the framework as laid out by the Court of Appeal in  Barker v Baxendale Walker . 80 
 E. The Measure of Damages 
 Apart from determining the test to be applied, the  ‘ decisional ’ negligence and  ‘ operational ’ 
negligence distinction is important because it also affects the applicable measure of 
damages. Consider a proposed tax avoidance scheme, as in the case of  Barker v Baxendale 
Walker or  Halsall v Champion Consulting . We shall propose terms for four distinct types 
of damages that can potentially be awarded by a court in such a situation. First, we can 
calculate damages based on the expected payoff of the scheme succeeding (the  ‘ action 
expectation ’ measure). Secondly, we can calculate damages based on the losses that 
result from the scheme failing (what we will term the  ‘ action reliance ’ measure). Third, 
we can calculate damages based on the expected payoff of an alternative to the scheme 
succeeding (what we will term the  ‘ alternative expectation ’ measure). Finally, we can calculate 
damages based on the losses that result from an alternative to the scheme failing (what we 
will term the  ‘ alternative reliance ’ measure). 
 ‘ Operational ’ Negligence 
 In a case of  ‘ operational ’ negligence, the client  independently makes a decision to enter 
into a tax avoidance scheme, hoping to save taxes. The scheme fails due to the solicitor ’ s 
negligence and HMRC collects the taxes that the client would otherwise have been 
able to avoid paying. HMRC also imposes a penalty and the client has to bear the legal 
costs of negotiating a settlement with HMRC. 
 In this situation, a client successfully providing that his solicitor was negligent will 
be able to claim  action expectation damages , measured in terms of the tax saving the client 
would have obtained if his solicitor had acted competently. He can also claim  action 
reliance damages , measured in terms of the costs incurred as a result of the solicitor ’ s 
negligence. 
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 Such a client may not claim  alternative expectation or reliance damages measured in 
terms of the tax saving under an alternative scheme. Since he would not have pursued 
such an alternative scheme in any case, awarding alternative expectation and alternative 
reliance damages would effectively allow him to escape from a bad decision that was not 
the product of his solicitor ’ s negligence. In the case of a contractual breach, if reliance 
damages exceed expectation damages, the law will not generally allow the aggrieved party 
to escape from a bad bargain by claiming reliance damages. 81 The aggrieved party may 
not claim for more than he would have received had the contract been performed in full. 
There is no reason to suppose why a similar principle should not apply here. 
 ‘ Decisional ’ Negligence 
 In a case of  ‘ decisional ’ negligence, the negligence of the solicitor relates to the decision 
on whether to enter into the tax avoidance scheme or pursue an alternative in the 
fi rst place. There are two potential situations here: fi rst, where a client relies on his 
solicitor ’ s negligent advice to enter into the proposed tax avoidance scheme, when 
he would otherwise have pursued a different course of action; and second, where the 
client wishes to pursue a proposed tax avoidance scheme, but is instead persuaded, due 
to the negligent advice of his solicitor, not to enter into that scheme and to pursue an 
alternative course of action instead. 
 Would Have Chosen Alternative if not for Negligent Advice 
 In the fi rst case, the client pursues the proposed tax avoidance scheme on the negligent 
advice of his solicitor. The scheme fails through no  ‘ operational ’ negligence on the part of 
the solicitor and HMRC collects the taxes that the client would otherwise have been able 
to avoid paying. HMRC also imposes a penalty and the client has to bear the legal costs of 
negotiating a settlement with HMRC. 
 In this situation, a client successfully providing that his solicitor was negligent should 
be able to claim  alternative expectation damages , on the basis that he would have obtained 
a tax saving using the  alternative scheme if his solicitor had acted competently and given 
him proper advice. He can also claim  action reliance damages to cover the  costs incurred from 
pursuing the tax avoidance scheme on reliance of his solicitor ’ s negligence. 
 The client will not be able to claim  action expectation damages (i.e. a tax saving). 
Since he would not have pursued the tax avoidance scheme had his solicitor not been 
negligent, allowing him to claim action expectation damages would allow him to escape 
from a bad decision. Neither will he be able to claim  alternative reliance damages : he never 
entered into the alternative scheme and thus, never suffered such losses. 
 Would Have Chosen Scheme if not for Negligent Advice  
 In the second case, the client is dissuaded from entering into the proposed tax avoidance 
scheme on the negligent advice of his solicitor. Instead, he pursues an alternative scheme. 
The alternative scheme fails through no  ‘ operational ’ negligence on the part of the solicitor 
and HMRC collects the taxes that the client would otherwise have been able to avoid 
 81  Anglia TV v Reed [ 1972 ]  1 QB 60 ; and  C & P Haulage v Middleton [ 1983 ]  3 All ER 94 . 
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paying on the alternative scheme. HMRC also imposes a penalty and the client has to bear 
the legal costs of negotiating a settlement with HMRC. 
 In this situation, a client successfully providing that his solicitor was negligent should 
be able to claim  action expectation damages : the client would have been able to obtain a tax 
saving using the proposed scheme if his solicitor had acted competently and given him 
proper advice. He can also claim  alternative reliance damages , measured in terms of the costs 
of the alternative scheme failing if his solicitor had not been negligent. 
 The client will not be able to claim alternative expectation damages because he 
would have pursued the scheme had his solicitor not been negligent, and to allow him 
to claim alternative expectation damages now would allow him to escape from a bad 
decision. He will not be able to claim action reliance damages simply because he never 
entered into the scheme and thus, never suffered such losses. 
 The Traditional Position: Loss of a Chance 
 Traditionally, in cases of non-medical professional negligence, particularly those involving 
solicitors, the measure of damages applied is that of a  ‘ loss of a chance ’ , the archetypal 
case in this area being  Allied Maples v Simmons  & Simmons. 82 The starting point is that the 
law must treat  ‘ the loss of a chance of a favourable outcome as compensatable damage in 
itself  ’ . 83 The claimant must then establish on a balance of probabilities that he has lost 
such a chance. Finally, the lost chance must be quantifi ed by resort to percentages and 
proportions. 84 The law is prepared to recognise the loss of a chance as an identifi able head 
of loss in itself where the provision of the chance is the object of the duty that has been 
breached. To put it another way, the  ‘ essence of the breach of duty is that it deprives the 
claimant of the chance or opportunity of securing a favourable outcome ’ . 85 
 However, it is submitted that it may be an oversimplifi cation to assume that the 
measure of damages for non-medical professional negligence will always be that of loss of 
a chance. The measure of damages for the loss of a chance arises where  ‘ the chance lost is 
dependent upon how a third party might have acted or have failed to act ’ . 86 Whether loss 
of a chance applies in a case depends on which of the four measures of damages discussed 
above apply. 
 In the case of the  reliance measures of damages , the issue of loss of a chance does not 
arise. These damages are only claimable if actual losses have been suffered as a result of 
pursuing a course of action that has failed. 
 Where the expectation measures of damages are concerned, the loss of a chance 
does not invariably feature. 87 Loss of a chance only comes into play where the three 
necessary conditions for loss of a chance claims are satisfi ed: where the loss of a chance 
is a recognisable head of damage; where the claimant can establish on a balance of 
probabilities that he has lost such a chance; and where the lost chance can be quantifi ed 
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by resort to percentages and proportions. Accordingly, loss of a chance will not feature 
where it is clear that an expected outcome would have eventuated if not for the solicitor ’ s 
negligence. It will, conversely, feature where there is some uncertainty as to whether the 
expected outcome would have eventuated. In such a case, there is a need to quantify 
the lost chance by considering the probably that the expected outcome would have 
eventuated. 
 Illustration:  Barker v Baxendale Walker 
 In  Barker v Baxendale Walker , the High Court held (and the Court of Appeal did not 
dispute) that if the solicitor had been negligent, the client would have been entitled to 
claim fi ve heads of damages: 1) professional fees and charges in connection with the 
setting up of the tax avoidance scheme; 2) trustees ’ costs and fees in connection with the 
administration of the trusts in the scheme; 3) professional fees in respect of negotiations 
with HMRC; 4) costs of unwinding the scheme; and 5) the sum paid to HMRC under 
the settlement reached with them on account of tax and interest. 88 In terms of item 5, 
the High Court did not propose to award the client with the full sum paid to HMRC 
on the settlement, but instead proposed to subtract the amount of tax that the client 
would have had to pay anyway under an alternative scheme, taking into consideration 
the probability of success of the alternative scheme. 
 Following the framework proposed above, it is possible to classify (1), (2), (3), (4) and 
part of (5) as action reliance damages. Item 5 can be broken down into two components: 
1) the interest charged by HMRC; and 2) the additional tax paid above what would 
have been due if the alternative scheme had been entered into. The second component 
of item 5 can be classifi ed as alternative expectation damages. The loss of a chance 
measure of damages was applied to the alternative expectation damages under the second 
component of item 5. Roth J at the High Court assessed the probability of success of the 
alternative scheme succeeding at 70 per cent, before accordingly adjusting the amount 
under that head of damages to refl ect this. 89 
 F. Conclusion 
 This article has tracked the parallel development of  ‘ decisional ’ negligence in both 
medical and non-medical professional negligence cases and noted that common issues 
arise in both fi elds. With the advent of  Montgomery , it has perhaps been understandable that 
one should seek to explore whether the  Montgomery principle can similarly be extended 
into non-medical professional negligence cases. This article has sought to argue that the 
fundamental basis of the  Montgomery principle is very much confi ned to medical law 
and that the  Bolam test should continue to be applied in non-medical professional 
negligence cases. That being said, there is no need for the Courts to feel bound by the 
views of the experts called in to give evidence before them. Following  Bolitho , if a Court 
is unable to fi nd a body of professional opinion that is reasonable or responsible, 90 it 
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may nevertheless apply the  Bolam test and itself determine what a reasonable professional 
would have done in the circumstances. 
 In terms of the measure of damages, this article has argued that there are four distinct 
measures of damages that may potentially be applicable in non-medical professional 
negligence cases: 1) action expectation, 2) action reliance, 3) alternative expectation and 
4) alternative reliance. In cases of  ‘ operational ’ negligence, (1) and (2) may potentially 
be claimed, whereas in  ‘ decisional ’ negligence cases, (1) and (4), or (2) and (3) may 
potentially be claimed, depending on the situation. In both cases of  ‘ operational ’ and 
 ‘ decisional ’ negligence, there may be the need to apply the loss of a chance measure, where 
expectation damages are involved. It is not the case that in every case of non-medical 
professional negligence, the loss of a chance measure of damages must be applied. 
 Moving forward, it is submitted that the framework proposed for the measure 
of damages in non-medical professional negligence cases can also apply in medical 
negligence cases, where the  Montgomery principle applies. While the specifi c medical 
concerns in  Montgomery prevent the application of the same standard and duties of care 
to non-medical professionals, conceptually, it would appear that there are no issues with 
applying the same measure of damages to both non-medical and medical professional 
negligence. 
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